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ABSTRACT 
 
Pipelines are the most efficient mode of transportation for various chemicals and are 
considered as safe, yet pipeline incidents remain occurring. Corrosion is one of the main reasons 
for incidents especially in subsea pipelines due to the harsh corrosive environment that prevails. 
Corrosion can be attributed to 36% amongst all the causes of subsea pipeline failure. Internal 
corrosion being an incoherent process, one can never forecast exact occurrences inside a pipeline 
resulting in highly unpredictable risk. Therefore, this paper focuses on risk assessment of internal 
corrosion in subsea pipelines. Corrosion is time-dependent phenomena, and conventional risk 
assessment tools have limited capabilities of quantifying risk in terms of time dependency. 
Hence, this paper presents a Dynamic Bayesian Network (DBN) model to assess and 
manage the risk of internal corrosion in subsea. DBN possesses certain advantages such as 
representation of temporal dependence between variable, ability to handle missing data, ability to 
deal with continuous data, time- based risk update, observation of the change of variables with 
time and better representation of cause and effect relationship. This model aims to find the cause 
of internal corrosion and predict the consequence in case of pipeline failure given the reliability of 
safety barrier in place at each time step. It also demonstrates the variation of corrosion promoting 
agents, corrosion rate and safety barriers with time. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
σg Standard deviation of limit state function 
μg Mean of limit state function 
σf Flow stress of pipe 
σu Ultimate tensile strength 
λDU Dangerous failure rate dangerous undetected  
Δt Time Interval 
A Actuator 
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process 
C1 Consequence that there is no loss of containment 
C2 Consequence that there is limited loss of containment 
C3 Consequence that there is huge loss of containment 
CPT Conditional Probability Table 
CR Corrosion Rate 
D Diameter of pipe 
DAG Directed Acyclic Graph 
DBN Dynamic Bayesian Network 
d(t) Defect depth 
do Initial defect depth 
ESD Emergency Shutdown 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
IV Isolation Valve 
vii 
L Load 
l Defect length 
LS Logic Solver 
LSF/g Limit State Function 
M Folias factor 
MCS Monte-Carlo Simulation 
MFS Mass Flow Sensor 
OODBN Object-oriented Dynamic Bayesian Network 
P Internal pressure  
PFD Probability of failure of demand 
POF Probability of failure of the pipeline  
Pll Probability of large leak 
Prp Probability of rupture 
PS Pressure Sensor 
Psl Probability of small leak 
R Resistance 
rbp Maximum pressure the pipe can withstand before it could 
collapse 
rrp Maximum pressure the pipe can withstand before it 
could rupture 
t Time  
TI Test time interval 
wt Wall thickness 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Pipelines are the lifeline of oil/gas and petrochemical industries. They are efficient, 
reliable, safer, environmentally friendly and economical (Bharadwaj, 2014); yet; pipeline incidents 
remain a petrifying factor exposing industries to scrutiny.   
Hence, pipeline industries have an obligation to identify hazards and deal with risks 
invariably throughout the lifetime of the pipeline to avoid incidents and economic loss as much as 
possible. Therefore, to meet their obligation, a risk assessment tool is recommended to help explain 
pipeline failure and its consequences, analyze risk and take decision for mitigation and prevention 
of risk more effectively, make the calculations and analysis less tedious and produce robust results. 
There had been 1,978 incidents between the years 2001 and 2011 in UK continental shelf 
according to UK health and safety executive, 2011, due to offshore hydrocarbon release. 
According to PHMSA,2014 there had been 71 incidents owing to hydrocarbon release from 
offshore pipelines during the period 2004-2014. Moreover, Inspection and maintenance are 
comparatively more expensive for offshore pipelines. So, to better solve the problems faced by 
offshore pipeline industries, this research focuses on carrying out risk assessment in offshore 
pipelines. Among various factors that lead to pipeline failure in subsea such as third-party damage, 
corrosion, natural force damage, mechanical damage, incorrect operation, material/equipment 
damage, etc., corrosion is said to be one of the major contributors (Khan,2016). Internal corrosion 
and external corrosion are the two types of corrosion in a pipeline based on the location of the 
defect. Between the two types of corrosion, internal corrosion risk assessment seems to be more 
challenging, primarily due to difficulty in seeing and accessing the affected area and comparatively 
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inefficient protection against contributing factors that are dynamic and unpredictable. To address 
the mentioned difficulty, this paper will focus on developing an effective and robust risk 
assessment tool to monitor increasing internal corrosion rate and help in taking decisions to 
mitigate and prevent pipeline failure due to internal corrosion for the subsea pipeline. 
Due to the high complexity and dynamic characteristics of modern systems, recent research 
development on risk assessment and management is evolving by considering advanced modeling 
technique and temporal/time variation of the system (Khan,2015). In accordance to the 
advancement in risk assessment and risk management, along with developing a dynamic model, 
this research aims at including the advantages of BN (Bayesian Network) such as handling missing 
or uncertain data successfully, helping to better understand cause-effect relationship and analyzing 
the results of both forward and backward inferences, by proposing DBN (Dynamic Bayesian 
Network) for assessing risk of internal corrosion in subsea pipeline.   
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
In 2012, the overall cost of pipelines had increased to more than $1 trillion contributing to 
6.2% of the GDP (Ossai, 2012). Corrosion is said to be the reason for pipeline failure 15 to 20 
percent of the times, resulting in significant incidents (Groeger, 2012) which are discussed further. 
On November 22, 2013, an explosion due to a pipeline carrying oil occurred at Qingdao in eastern 
China. The explosion killed 62 people and injured 136 and resulted in a loss of $124.9 million. 
The reason for the incident is said to be corrosion (NACE, 2013). On August 19, 2000, a pipeline 
owned by El Paso Natural Gas, exploded. This incident resulted in property damage of $1 million 
and 12 fatalities and is due to internal corrosion (NACE, 2000). On August 20, 2014, at Buckeye 
Partners, LP, a leak was found in a pipe segment due to internal corrosion. This incident resulted 
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in a loss of 143 barrels of Jet Fuel(PHMSA). Such incidents are said to occur due to inefficiency 
in detecting/preventing/controlling of corrosion promptly. Therefore, to maintain the integrity of 
the pipeline and to take a better decision on preventive and mitigative measures of pipeline failure, 
it has become paramount to have an efficient and robust risk assessment methodology. Since 
internal corrosion is comparatively more relentless and requires continuous inspection and 
maintenance, this study focuses on assessing risk due to internal corrosion in the pipeline 
(Maintaining the integrity of the marine pipeline network, 1994). Since corrosion is more 
prominent in subsea due to the harsh environment, subsea pipeline is considered in this study. 
As discussed above, existing pipeline corrosion risk assessment methods fail to have a 
blend of quantifying risk based on time, investigate the cause leading to corrosion and predict the 
consequence in a single framework which will be addressed in this research. 
 
1.2 Organization of the thesis  
 
 In chapter 2, Literature review, internal corrosion overview, description about FT (Fault 
tree), BN and DBN are presented along with problem statement and objective. In chapter 3, a brief 
description of the methodology is given. In chapter 4 a case study is presented, and the results are 
discussed. In chapter 5, the summary of the research is described with the conclusion and future 
work. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
The literature review is done on existing pipeline corrosion risk assessment models and is divided 
into three subsections as follows: 
1. Static models 
2. Dynamic models 
3. BN models 
This chapter further describes the limitations of static and BN models to quantify risk based 
on time along strengths and weaknesses of other dynamic models. The reason as to why DBN 
is considered as a more superior tool when compared to other existing tools and how it can be 
used to address the research gap is discussed in the problem statement and objective 
respectively. A brief description of internal corrosion, FT, BN, DBN, and mapping algorithms 
are also presented. 
2.1 Static Models 
Several models are static and are used to carry out corrosion risk assessment in pipeline which 
are discussed below: 
 Bertuccio et al., used fuzzy-logic and expert judgment to determine the likelihood and 
consequence of pipeline failure due to corrosion. 
 Monte-Carlo simulation(MCS) was used by Lailin Sun et al., to determine the probability of 
failure of pipeline that uses failure pressure model with different data iteratively. 
 Perumal et al., rated the likelihood of probability and the consequence of failure. The overall 
risk was calculated, and the severity of risk was visualized in a risk matrix. 
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 Chaves et al., used MCS with bootstrap which uses random sampling with replacement and 
presented a probability density function for pipeline failure. 
 Datta et al., consolidated corrosion model of pipeline, pipe wrap protection model and pipe 
stress model and presented a probability density function for POF of the pipeline. 
 Finite element method was used by Xu et al., to study geometries and spacing due to the 
interactive defect of an existing defective pipe which was then applied to Artificial Neural 
Networks (ANN). This was then used to assess the failure of the pipeline. 
 CX model was developed by Cheng et al., that uses an elastoplastic model based on stress and 
strain to determine mechanical integrity of the pipeline. This model was compared with ASME 
and DNV models. 
 Omelegbe et al., proposed a NORSOK model based on the combination of factors affecting 
CO2 corrosion such as inhibitors and water-cut. It was used to predict the probability 
distribution of CO2 corrosion rate of the pipeline. The probability of worst-case scenario of 
having 10,50,90% chances of corrosion rates was obtained by applying MCS in NORSOK 
model. (Omelegbe, 2009) 
 Barton et al., proposed a corrosion risk assessment methodology based on flow modeling and 
the critical location of significant threat for inspection planning was determined. 
 Amirat et al., implemented a probabilistic reliability assessment of pipeline after combining 
applied residual stress and corrosion model using experimental data. The consequence was 
proposed as a function of pipe location relative to where a pipe failure could occur. The overall 
risk was then evaluated. 
 Slayter et al., used SSURGO database to collect soil data and consulted the pipeline manager 
to collect data for defect depth location. These data were analyzed using statistical analysis. 
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The coefficient of pipeline corrosion and soil condition was determined using deterministic 
statistics and this was followed by predicting the probability of event occurrence using logistic 
regression analysis. 
It had been observed that these models do not consider the time-dependent characteristics of 
corrosion and its variation of associated risks with time. These studies also fail to address 
complete risk assessment structure which includes the probability of failure of pipeline, 
consequence and safety barriers in a single framework. 
2.2 Dynamic Models 
Some of the studies from the literature that considers time-dependent nature of corrosion and 
failure of the pipeline are as follows: 
• A statistical approach was used by Oliver et al., to assess the historical data, and future 
failures of different scenarios were characterized using uncertainty modeling. 
• A statistical model was developed by Cobanoglu et al., from past historical data for 
pipeline reliability followed by optimization of maintenance and replacement plant. 
• Markov chain was proposed to assess the corrosion progress with time in the pipeline by 
Yusof et al., 
• Soares et al., has proposed a corrosion wastage model expressed as a time-based non-linear 
function of immersion corrosion mechanism. This model considers the influence of 
environmental condition, trading routes and amount of time spent by pipe segment in every 
environmental condition. 
• Velázquez et al., used power model to determine the variation of maximum defect depth 
in corrosion rate with respect to time. This was followed by regression analysis of the 
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relation between maximum defect depth and other parameters influencing corrosion such 
as soil and pipe properties and pipeline age. 
• Younsi et al., proposed a pipeline integrity assessment method. The load and resistance 
parameters of Limit State Function(LSF) is obtained from probabilistic transformation 
method and Monte Carlo simulation respectively. Gamma and gaussian distribution 
depicted the corrosion rate model and the probability of failure of the pipeline of a 
particular length and defect depth. 
• Zangenehmardar et al., used Artificial Neural Network(ANN) model which was developed 
using Levenberg-Marquardt backpropagation algorithm in his study. Pipe material, 
condition, length, diameter, and breakage rate were given as input to ANN, and the 
remaining useful life of pipelines was predicted. 
• Gartland et al., developed a corrosion rate model based on the combination of water 
wetting prediction, calculation of pH, multiphase flow modeling, CO2 and H2S corrosion 
model. Data was collected from inspection and monitoring of pipe. A probability 
distribution for the corrosion prediction was established, and failure pressure model was 
developed which was used to predict permissible corrosion attack. 
• McCallum et al., used non-homogeneous poison process and markov analysis to determine 
pit initiation and pit growth. MCS was used to determine the probability of the pit depth 
being lesser than particular defect depth over time. 
• Melchers et al., proposed a model consisting of 3 phases of corrosion that was 
parameterized and calibrated using datapoint. The probabilistic nature of the model was 
then depicted which shows the variation of corrosion over time at each phase. 
8 
Though these models depict the varying corrosion growth or rate over time, they do not discuss 
how the variation of corrosion promoting agents over time affects corrosion. They also do not 
consider the probability of failure of the pipeline due to corrosion and consequence given the 
reliability of safety barrier in a single framework. They have certain limitations such as the 
inability to handle missing data, inferring the results both backward and forward based on 
given evidence, and easy updating of data as and when it becomes available. 
2.3 BN models 
BN has proved to be a promising methodology which can address the limitations that have 
been discussed previously in section 2.2. Application of BN in handling risk assessment of 
pipeline corrosion is relatively new. The recent studies in the related field are as follows: 
 Khan et al., (2016) described the mapping of bow-tie model of subsea pipeline corrosion
to Bayesian Network.
 Bhandari et al., (2016) described offshore pipeline reliability assessment using non-linear
power model for pitting corrosion using BN.
 Ehsan et al., (2017) developed a DBN to determine the fatigue life of subsea pipeline due
to pitting corrosion.
 Ayello et al., (2014) developed a Bayesian Network to assess both internal and external
corrosion in the pipeline and calculated the probability of failure of the pipeline.
 Oleg et al., (2016) has developed a Bayesian Network for pipeline internal corrosion
assessment comprising of corrosion promoting agents and various pipeline failure pressure
model to determine the probability of failure of the pipeline. The defect depth and
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probability of failure of the pipeline were visualized using GIS (Geographic Information 
System). 
The models that are mentioned above do not consider the following in a single framework: 
1. Depicting the variation of corrosion rate over time and temporal-dependence of 
corrosion promoting agents between two time-slices. 
2. Determination of causal factor and prediction of consequence due to corrosion. 
3. Varying safety reliability over time and it’s influence on the consequence. 
2.4 Problem Statement 
Risk assessment of pipeline due to internal corrosion involves dynamic characteristics such 
as environmental condition, inspection and testing time interval of safety barriers, operating 
condition, aging of equipment, the growth of corrosion defect depth, etc. Conventional 
methodologies that are static do not address the dynamic variation of parameters. Though many 
dynamic methods exist, for better assessment of pipeline failure, a model is required that includes 
all of the following in a single framework: 
 Representation of varying influence of corrosion promoting agents on corrosion rate. 
 Calculation of corrosion rate. 
 Calculation of POF of pipeline. 
 Analysis of consequence depending on the reliability of pipeline and safety barrier. 
 Representation of variation of dynamic parameters such as corrosion promoting agents, 
corrosion rate and reliability of safety barrier. 
 Causal analysis of corrosion. 
Moreover, it is suggested for the model to also possess some advanced computational techniques 
such as: 
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 Representation of temporal dependence of variables. 
 Visual representation of cause and effect relationship. 
 Forward and backward inference of cause and consequence. 
 Handling missing or uncertain data. 
2.5 Objectives 
 
To address the problem stated in the previous subsection, this study aims at developing a 
DBN for pipeline risk assessment specific to internal corrosion with an objective to: 
1. Demonstrate the temporal change of corrosion promoting agents contributing to internal 
corrosion. 
2. Calculate corrosion rate given the defect depths at each time step. 
3. Predict the causal factor leading to internal corrosion by giving evidence on corrosion 
occurrence. 
4. Calculate the probability of pipeline failure at each time step, 
5. Compute the PFD of safety barrier depending on the deviation from testing within the 
recommended test time-interval. 
6. Analyze the consequence, given the probability of pipeline failure and varying reliability 
of safety barriers over time. 
2.6 Internal corrosion Overview 
 
Corrosion is a degradation mechanism of a material and its properties, that involves an 
electrochemical reaction between both anodic and cathodic region in the presence of an electrolyte, 
and corrosion can be stopped by removing either of the three components, i.e., anode/ 
cathode/electrolyte given a susceptible material as shown in figure 1. Corrosion occurring inside 
the pipeline, often due to the presence of CO2, H2O, H2S, and organic acids are termed as internal 
11 
corrosion (Bharadwaj, 2014).Sometimes it can also occur due to the presence of micro-organism 
(Corrosionpedia, 2018). 
Figure 1: Elements for corrosion mechanism 
The environmental and operating conditions inside a pipeline, play a significant role in 
promoting internal corrosion. An increase in pressure and temperature speeds up the corrosion 
reaction leading to higher corrosion rate. Sometimes, in the presence of corroding gas, a scale is 
formed, that acts as a protective barrier against corrosion, depending on the existing operating 
temperature and pressure. Corrosion rate increases proportionally with an increase in the degree 
of water wetting, i.e., amount of water content in contact with the pipe wall. Flow regime is 
dependent on the pipe geometry, fluid properties, roughness of pipe, superficial velocity of the 
fluid and the operating condition. The type of flow regime alters the shear stress imparted on the 
pipe wall and plays a vital role in formation/removal of the protective film. 
Electrolyte
Anode
Corrosion 
Mechanism
Cathode
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The deterioration of the material due to its contact with CO2 or similar corrosive agents 
and water is called sweet corrosion. This type of corrosion is weak and takes a longer time to 
deteriorate the material compared to sour corrosion. In the presence of water, carbon dioxide forms 
weak carbonic acid (Bharadwaj, 2014). 
H2O+CO2    H2CO3 
H2CO3 H
++HCO3
- 
HCO3- H+CO3
- 
The carbonic acid acts as anion and the hydrogen ion as the oxidizer, thus leading to corrosion 
mechanism. Sweet corrosion is enhanced further in the presence of O2 and organic acid, an increase 
in temperature, pressure, and CO2. 
Sour corrosion occurs in the presence of sulfuric acid and water.H2S dissociates as 
following in the presence of water (Bharadwaj, 2014): 
H2S           H
++HS- 
HS- H++S- 
Sulfide acts as cathode and Fe2+ which is the ion released from pipe material, act as an anode. 
Presence of H2S can result in two types of effects, corrosion and sulfide stress corrosion 
cracking(SSCC) depending on the environmental condition(Khan,2016). 
Micro-organisms in the presence of water, oxidizes fatty acid and generates CO2, and 
sulfide which results in corrosion similar to sweet or sour corrosion (Bharadwaj, 2014). The 
internal wall of the pipeline is coated, and anti-corrosion inhibitors are injected to prevent pipeline 
deterioration from such type of corrosions. Inhibitors are chemical agents which get adhered to the 
pipeline or react with corrodent, decreasing its corrosive strength. Coating isolates the pipe from 
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the harsh corrosive environment and prevents water contact with pipeline inner surface (Fatmala, 
2016). 
2.7 Fault tree 
 
A fault tree is used to provide a visual top-down representation of cause to consequence 
analysis using Boolean logic. The undesired state of the system is termed as the top event. The 
causal factors contributing to the top event are classified as basic and intermediate events. Arcs 
and Boolean logic gates are used to connect basic events to intermediate events and then to top 
event (Panaitesco, 2018). An example of fault tree is shown in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2:Representation of FT 
 
In figure 2, basic events 1 & 2 are connected to intermediate event 1 through OR gate which means 
either basic event 1 or 2 must be true for intermediate event 1 to be true. Similarly, basic events 3 
& 4 are connected to intermediate event 2 through OR gate. The intermediate events 1&2 are 
connected to the top event through AND gate, which implies both intermediate events must be true 
for the top event to be true. 
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2.8 Bayesian network 
 
Bayesian network is used to represent the probabilistic graphical relationship between 
random variables. (J.Hulst, 2006). 
The basis of BN is the Bayes’ theorem and is stated as (J.Hulst, 2006): 
𝑃 (𝐴|𝐵) = 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴)𝑋𝑃(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐵)
         (1) 
Where, 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐵) is the likelihood of A occurring, given B’s state of occurrence. 
𝑃(𝐵|𝐴) is the likelihood of B occurring, given A’s state of occurrence. 
𝑃(𝐴) is the likelihood of A occurring. 
𝑃(𝐵) is the likelihood of B occurring. 
The qualitative element of BN is represented by directed acyclic graph (DAG). Variables are 
represented as nodes and arc represents the causal relationship between the child node and the 
parent node.BN is quantified by using the conditional probability table (CPT). CPT defines the 
marginal probability of a variable dependent to another. 
 
  
15 
 
 
Figure 3: Example of BN 
 
For example, in the above figure, A, B, and C are considered as the random variables where C is 
influenced by A & B. Here C is the parent node and A & B are child nodes. The CPT for C is 
defined which gives the probability of the hidden node given the parent node. 
2.8.1 Network Structure 
Consider ‘n’ stochastic random variables, X1, X2, X3……Xn in BN. If an arc points 
towards X2 from X1, then X1 is the child node, and X2 is the parent node. The joint probabilistic 
distribution 𝑃(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3 … . . 𝑋𝑛) of the variables with state Xk is represented as follows (J.Hulst, 
2006): 
𝑃(𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3 … 𝑋𝑛) = ∏ 𝑝(𝑋𝑘|𝑃𝑎(𝑋𝑘))
𝑛
𝑘=1       (2) 
Where, 
 𝑃𝑎(𝑋𝑘) is parent of Xk. 
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2.8.2 Bayesian Probability 
 
BN possess two important rules, i.e., expansion rule and chain rule which are discussed 
further. 
2.8.2.1 Expansion rule 
 
Consider 2 random variables X & Y, with j possible outcomes, then, 
𝑃(𝑋) = 𝑝(𝑋|𝑦𝑗 = 1 ). 𝑝(𝑦𝑗 = 1) + 𝑝(𝑋|𝑦𝑗 = 2). 𝑝(𝑦𝑗 = 2) + ⋯ + 𝑝(𝑋|𝑦𝑗 = 𝑗). 𝑝(𝑦𝑗 = 𝑗) 
=∑ 𝑝(𝑋|𝑌). 𝑝(𝑌)𝑌          (3) 
In this rule, All the information of Y is ignored, and importance is given to only probability of X. 
This is also known as the marginal probability (J.Hulst, 2006). 
2.8.2.2 Chain rule 
The product rule is obtained by rewriting the Bayes’ theorem as follows 
𝑃(𝑋, 𝑌) = 𝑝(𝑋|𝑌). 𝑝(𝑌) = 𝑝(𝑌|𝑋). 𝑝(𝑋)       (4) 
Consecutive application of product rule results in chain rule stated as follows 
𝑃(𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝑛) = 𝑝(𝑋1) ∏ 𝑝(𝑋𝑖|𝑋1, … . . , 𝑋𝑖 − 1)𝑛𝑖=2      (5) 
Where, 
X1, X2……Xi-1 is a subset of variable Xi. (J.Hulst, 2006) 
2.8.3 Inference 
 
Inference is updating the probability for a hypothesis as and when more evidence and 
information are known. For e.g., from figure 3, if the probability of A being ‘true' needs to be 
calculated given that C is true, then C is called the evidence variable and ‘A' as query variable. 
The equation used to calculate this inference of BN in the figure is as follows (J.Hulst, 2006): 
𝑝(𝐴|𝐶) =
𝑝(𝐶|𝐴)𝑋𝑝(𝐴)
𝑃(𝐶)
          (6) 
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Using the expansion rule and product rule, it can be re-written as 
𝑃(𝐴|𝐶) = 𝑝(𝐶|𝐴𝑖). 𝑝(𝑖). 𝑝(𝐴)/ ∑ ∑ 𝑝(𝐶|𝐴𝑖). 𝑝(𝐴). 𝑝(𝑖)𝐼𝐴      (7) 
= (0.95𝑥0.1 + 0.7𝑥0.9)𝑥0.4/(0.95𝑥0.4𝑥0.1 + 0.4𝑥0.6𝑥0.1 + 0.7𝑥0.4𝑥0.9 + 0.01𝑥0.6𝑥0.9) 
=0.91 
2.9 Mapping of a FT to BN 
 
A fault tree is mapped to BN both qualitatively and quantitatively. In the qualitative step, 
the primary events, intermediate events and top events of fault tree are mapped to root nodes, 
intermediate nodes, and pivot nodes respectively in BN as shown in figure 4. The nodes in BN is 
connected in the same way as that of fault tree with the arcs. In the numerical step, the basic 
probabilities of the primary events in the fault tree are correspondingly assigned as prior 
probabilities of the nodes in BN (Khakzad, 2011). The primary events are associated with the 
intermediate events through AND-gate or OR-gate in a FT, and the equivalent mapping of these 
gates to BN using conditional probability table is shown in figure 5 (Barua, 2012). 
 
Figure 4:Mapping algorithm of FT to BN (Khakzad, 2011) 
  
18 
 
 
Figure 5:Quantitative mapping of FT to BN (Barua, 2012) 
 
2.10 Dynamic Bayesian Network 
 
DBN is a Bayesian network that also shows the conditional relationship between time 
dependencies of variables over an arrangement of time series. In other words, it is defined as (B, 
B), where B is BN of initial state distribution, P(Zt) of the variable Zt. B defines the transitional 
model P(Zt|Zt-1). Zt is represented as Zt= (Ut, Xt, Yt), where Ut, Xt, and Yt are input, hidden and 
output variables of the model respectively (J.Hulst, 2006). The joint probability distribution of 
two-time slices is given as: 
p(Zt|Zt-1) = ∏ 𝑝(𝑍𝑡 
𝑖 |𝑃𝑎(𝑍𝑡
𝑖))𝑁𝑖=1  
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In DBN, the time-dependent relationship of nodes between 2-time slices are represented and is 
quantified using conditional probability table. 
 
Figure 6:Example of DBN 
 
In figure 6, the state of A at time ‘t+1' is conditionally dependent on the state of A at a time ‘t’ and 
the state of B at ‘t+1’ is influenced by the state of A at ‘t+1’. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF DBN 
 
3.1 Research Methodology 
 
 The material of construction of pipe and electrochemical environment influences the 
internal corrosion rate. For an existing pipeline, the environmental condition varies over the length 
of the pipeline and changes with time (Muhlbauer, 2004). To combat the problem of the variation 
of risk over the distance, the pipe is segmented according to the similarity in electrochemical 
environmental characteristic, before performing the proposed risk assessment model which takes 
time variation of risk parameters into account.  
The visual representation of risk assessment model proposed is shown in figure 7. The 
corrosion promoting agents that contribute to internal corrosion are identified, and their 
relationships are represented using FT which is later converted to BN. The BN is then converted 
to DBN by establishing temporal dependence between the corrosion promoting agents of two 
different time steps using discrete nodes. The defect depths from inspection data are collected, and 
the corrosion rate is calculated. If the corrosion rate is greater than zero, then evidence that internal 
corrosion is ‘true' is provided in the internal corrosion node of DBN. Given the evidence, the 
posterior probability of corrosion promoting agents are computed to find out the causes of 
corrosion. The node with highest posterior probability is concluded to be the major causal factor 
for internal corrossion. The probability of LSFs (Limit State Functions) being less than zero and 
subsequent probability of failure of the pipeline is computed. Assuming the presence of ESD 
(Emergency Shutdown System) as a safety barrier, the overall probability of failure on demand is 
determined. Given the safety barrier and the probability of failure of the pipeline, the frequency of 
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consequence is calculated and analyzed. The temporal dependence of corrosion promoting agents, 
corrosion rate and safety barrier between two-time slices are established. This is shown in figure 
7. The steps involved are further discussed in detail in the following subsections.  
 
Figure 7:Framework for the pipeline internal corrosion model based on Dynamic Bayesian           
    Network  
3.1.1 Corrosion promoting agents 
 
In this model, the first step is to identify the corrosion promoting agents that contribute to 
the pipeline corrosion and to construct fault tree. The relationship between the corrosion promoting 
agents and corrosion along with temporal dependence between corrosion promoting agents 
between one-time step and the next time step is established as shown in figure 8. This is done in 
DBN by converting FT to BN and then to DBN using discrete nodes as discussed in the previous 
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chapter.After the calculation of internal corrosion rate, which is discussed in the next subsection, 
evidence of whether corrosion has occurred or not along with other evidence is given as input to 
investigate the causal factor. The variable which has the highest posterior probability is said to be 
the major contributor to the occurrence of corrosion.   
   
 
Figure 8:Temporal dependence of corrosion promoting variables between adjacent time steps 
 
3.1.2 Calculation of internal corrosion rate  
 
The defect depth after each inspection is collected. The defect depth is assumed to vary 
linearly and is calculated at each time step using the following equation (Khan,2014).  
𝐶𝑅 =
(𝑑(𝑡)−𝑑𝑜)
𝑡
        (8) 
Where, 
𝐶𝑅 is corrosion rate 
𝑑(𝑡) is the defect depth at time ‘t,' and  
𝑑𝑜 is the initial defect depth  
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The temporal dependence of corrosion rate between the time slices is represented by equalizing 
the initial defect depth to the defect depth at previous time step. This can be visualized in figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9:Temporal dependence of corrosion rate between adjacent time steps 
 
3.1.3 Calculation of probability of failure of the pipeline 
 
Limit state function (LSF) is a condition beyond which the system/structure doesn't meet 
the design criteria. It is represented as the difference between load (L), on the system and resistance 
(R) of the system, to sustain the load. (Khan,2014) 
 𝑔 = 𝐿 − 𝑅         (9) 
The probability of a small leak, large leak and rupture are then calculated using their respective 
LSF values. (Khan,2014) 
• LSF1 for corrosion defect penetrating pipe wall(Khan,2014): 
            𝑔1(𝑡) = 𝑑𝑐 − 𝑑(𝑡)        (10) 
            𝑑𝑐 = 0.8 ∗  𝑤𝑡         (11) 
Where,  
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𝑑𝑐 is critical defect depth.  
𝑤𝑡 is wall thickness. 
𝑑(𝑡) is defect depth at time ‘t.'  
            The critical defect depth is 80% of wall thickness (Khan, 2014). 
• LSF2 for plastic collapse under internal pressure(Khan,2014): 
            𝑔2(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑏𝑝 − 𝑝(𝑡)        (12) 
 Where, 
 𝑟𝑏𝑝 is resistance pressure to plastic collapse. 
            𝑝(𝑡) is internal operating pressure at time ‘t.'  
            According to failure pressure model standard DNV-RP-F101, 
            rbp(t)= 2 ∗ t ∗
σu
D−wt
∗ [1 −
d(t)
wt
]/[1 − (
d(t)
Mwt
)]     (13) 
             𝑀 = √[1 + 0.31 (
𝑙2
𝐷𝑤𝑡
)]               (14) 
 Where, 
 σu is the ultimate tensile strength.  
𝑀 is the folias factor or bulging factor that describes the connection between out of shape 
geometry of the deformed structure and defect parameters such as defect depth and defect 
length. 
 𝑙 is corrosion defect length of the pipeline.  
 𝐷 is the diameter of the pipeline.  
• LSF3 for rupture (Amin, 2012): 
            𝑔3(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑏𝑝 − 𝑝(𝑡)        (15) 
           According to CSA Z662-07 standard, 
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           𝑟𝑏𝑝 =
2𝑤𝑡𝜎𝑓
𝑀𝐷
         (16) 
 𝑀 = (1 + 0.6275 ∗
𝑙2
𝐷𝑤𝑡
− 0.003375
𝑙4
𝐷2𝑤𝑡2
)0.5 for 
𝑙2
𝐷𝑤𝑡
≤ 50  (17)  
 𝑀 = 0.032
𝑙2
𝐷𝑤𝑡
+ 3.3     for 
𝑙2
𝐷𝑤𝑡
> 50  (18)   
 Where, 
 𝑟𝑏𝑝 is resistance pressure for rupture 
𝜎𝑓 is flow stress of pipe  
• Probability of LSF(g) being less than 0: 
Probability of failure=𝑃𝑟(𝑔 < 0)      (19) 
The normal distribution is converted to the standardized normal distribution that has a mean 
of 0 and standard deviation of 1 as shown in figure 10.  
𝑃𝑟(𝑔 < 0) = 𝜑(𝑧)        (20) 
𝑧 =
𝑥−𝜇𝑔
𝜎𝑔
          (21) 
Where x is the value being targeted in the normal distribution, i.e., 0 in this case. 𝜇𝑔 and 
𝜎𝑔 are mean and standard deviation of the LSF’s normal distribution. z is the equivalent 
value in the standardized normal distribution for x. The area under the graph beyond the z 
value is the probability of LSF being less than zero and can be obtained from z-chart.  
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Figure 10: Conversion of normal distribution to standard normal distribution (Arora, 2011) 
 
• Probability of failure of pipeline: 
The failure of pipeline can be classified as a small leak, large leak, and rupture based on the 
combinations of LSF equations being less or more than zero. So, probability of a small leak, 
large leak, and rupture at time ‘t' can be defined as follows. (Amin, 2012)   
Probability of small leak: 
𝑃𝑠𝑙(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑔1(𝑡) ≤ 0ꓵ𝑔2(𝑡) > 0]      (22) 
Probability of large leak: 
𝑃𝑙𝑙(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑔1(𝑡) > 0ꓵ𝑔2(𝑡)  ≤ 0)ꓵ𝑔3(𝑡) > 0]    (23) 
Probability of rupture: 
𝑃𝑟𝑝(𝑡) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏[𝑔1(𝑡) > 0ꓵ𝑔2(𝑡)  ≤ 0ꓵ𝑔3(𝑡)  ≤ 0]    (24) 
The overall probability of failure of the pipeline can be calculated as: 
𝑃𝑂𝐹 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃𝑠𝑙)𝑥(1 − 𝑃𝑙𝑙)𝑥(1 − 𝑃𝑟𝑝)     (25) 
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Figure 11: Calculation of POF of pipeline 
 
3.1.4  Safety Barrier 
 
The safety barrier is a physical/non-physical protective mean used to anticipate, prevent, 
control, and mitigate undesired events or incidents (Sklet, 2006). The safety barrier considered in 
this study is an automatic ESD. 
The probability of failure on demand (PFD) of all the components in an ESD is calculated 
according to the voting architecture. Voting architecture is the design decision of a safety 
instrumented system (SIS) and is represented as MooN (M out of N) where M represents the 
minimum number of channels required to perform the Safety Instrumented Function(SIF), and N 
represents the total number of channels (Hearn, 2017). Table 1 shows the simplified Markovian 
equations for PFD calculation of different voting architecture (Hearn, 2017).    
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Table 1: PFD calculations for each voting architecture (Hearn, 2017) 
Voting Architecture PFD equation 
1oo1 𝜆𝑇𝐼
2
1oo2 𝜆2𝑇𝐼2
3
2oo2 𝜆𝑇𝐼 
2oo3 𝜆2𝑇𝐼2
Where, 
𝜆𝐷𝑈 is dangerous undetected failure rate 
𝑇𝐼 is the testing time interval  
The overall PFD of a safety barrier is the sum of the PFDs of all its components. 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐸𝑆𝐷=∑ PFDi
𝑛
𝑖           (26)
The dynamic change in the reliability of safety barrier is demonstrated by applying a 
condition of whether the components are tested within the proof test interval (TI suggested by the 
industry/standard). PFD remains the same when the components of ESD are tested regularly within 
the test time interval of proof test, and it varies with irregular testing. When the PFD is not tested 
within recommended test interval, then the PFD varies according to test time of whenever the 
components of ESD system is tested. 
3.1.5 Consequence 
Three consequences are defined based solely on the reliability of pipeline and the ESD 
system as follows: 
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Table 2: Definition of different consequences 
Consequences POF of pipeline State of ESD system 
C1 No loss of containment; 
state remains safe 
0 Failure/Success 
C2 Limited loss of containment >0 Success 
C3 High loss of containment >0 Failure 
 No loss of containment; occurs when the POF (Probability of Failure) of the pipeline is 0.
 Limited loss of containment; occurs when there is a pipeline failure, and the safety barrier
succeeds in its function.
 Huge loss of containment; occurs when both the pipeline and safety barrier fail.
The overall PFD of the ESD system is calculated as discussed in the previous section. Given 
that the POF of pipeline is greater than 0 and depending on the failure or success of safety 
barrier, the frequency of consequence is represented and calculated using an event tree as 
shown in figure 12. 
Figure 12: ETA of pipeline failure 
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3.2       Software 
 
             There are various existing software programs used to develop DBN model. Bayes Net 
Toolbox for Matlab has most of the functionality required to develop DBN, but it is slow at 
processing, lacks Graphical User Interface (GUI) and has a conventional definition of DBN. 
Bayeslab and Netica have good GUI but unfortunately, lack functionality and are quite slow, 
making it difficult to solve complex problems. GENIE software is said to possess the, best of two 
worlds. It's GUI provides easy accessibility to core functionalities, and it also possesses rapid 
processing (J.Hulst,2006). GENIE was developed by decision system laboratory at the University 
of Pittsburgh (Bayesfusion, 2016). It allows representation of Object Oriented Network (OON), 
discussed in section 3.3 as OODBN, supports the use of both discrete and continuous variables, 
establishes temporal dependencies between variables and has cross compatibility with other 
dynamic Bayesian network models. GENIE can be downloaded for free for academic users from  
https://download.bayesfusion.com/files.html?category=Academia and the manual is available at 
http://support.bayesfusion.com/docs/genie.pdf. (Bayesfusion, 2016). 
GENIE 2.2 is the latest version of GENIE software that supports a hybrid model which allows 
representation of dependencies between both discrete and continuous variable which is used for 
this research.  
3.3 Visual representation of model using OODBN  
 
To facilitate construction of DBN and to obtain a clear visualization, the overall model is 
mapped to an OODBN as shown in figure 13. OODBN simplifies the complexity, updates 
algorithm and probability effectively and can model repetitive sub-networks with ease. The 
OODBN consists of sub-networks of BN with normal nodes and interface nodes where normal 
31 
nodes are used to represent the relationship between two nodes and the interface nodes are used 
for communication between the sub-networks (Renninger). 
Figure 13: OODBN of subsea pipeline internal corrosion risk assessment 
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CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY AND RESULT 
 
 According to experts, crude oil pipelines are said to face a major threat due to internal 
corrosion (NACE, Managing Corrosion Of Pipelines That Transport Crude Oils, 2013). Therefore, 
crude oil flowing through a transmission pipeline of carbon steel 316 is considered for this study. 
The pipeline is segmented according to the similarity in electrochemical environment and 
operating conditions. Given the same pipeline material and operating conditions, risk assessment 
is carried out for a selected segment. Inspection is assumed to be carried out every two years with 
measured flaw depths of 5.5,6.5,7.5,8.5,9.5,10.5,11.5,12.5,13.5 mm for 9-time steps and an initial 
flaw depth of 4.5mm. Therefore, the time-interval considered to carry out risk assessment is 2 
years. Other information about pipeline parameters is presented in table 3. 
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Table 3: Pipeline parameters used in the case study (Khan,2014) 
Variable Unit Mean Std 
deviation 
Distribution 
Internal 
Pressure 
P MPa 6.7 0.7 Normal 
distribution 
Diameter D Mm 600 18 Normal 
distribution 
Thickness T Mm 14 0.07 Normal 
distribution 
Pipe yield 
strength 
σy MPa 423 28 Normal 
distribution 
Pipe ultimate 
tensile 
strength 
σu MPa 550 36 Normal 
distribution 
Initial 
corrosion 
depth 
Do Mm 4.6 1.1 Normal 
distribution 
Initial 
corrosion 
length 
Lo Mm 200 4 Normal 
distribution 
Corrosion 
depth rate 
Drate mm/yr 0.2 0.04 Normal 
distribution 
Corrosion 
length rate 
Lrate mm/yr 20 4 Normal 
distribution 
 
The model is developed based on the following assumptions: 
 Sweet corrosion takes place with the constant increase in CO2, H2O. with a probability of 
80%.  All other corrosion promoting agents have an equal probability of change with time.  
 Micro-organisms in the pipeline are absent. 
 The operating conditions and pH remains the same over time.  
 Steady state flow is maintained in the pipeline. 
 The internal corrosion rate varies linearly following the equation CR=d(t)-do/t. 
 Emergency shutdown system is installed as a safety barrier with its components following 
1oo1 architecture. 
 Shut down is recommended for even a small leak. 
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 Organizational factors and human factors are absent.
 The sensors are sensitive and can detect a leak of any magnitude, and false detection is
absent.
 The consequence is categorized solely based on the failure of pipeline and success/failure
of the ESD system.
4.1 Developing discrete DBN 
A fault tree is constructed for internal corrosion in subsea as shown in figure 14, the top-event 
being the occurrence of internal corrosion and the basic events being the corrosion promoting 
agents of internal corrosion. The following corrosion promoting agents are identified as the causal 
factors contributing to internal corrosion(Khan,2016): 
 Presence of O2
 Presence of CO2
 Presence of H2S
 Presence of water
 Inhibitor failure
 Internal coating failure
 Poor pigging performance
 Internal large stress
 External large stress
 Residual stress
 Stress concentration
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The basic probabilities for the corrosion promoting agents are assigned as shown in table 4. These 
probabilities are taken from the literature (Khan,2016). 
 
 
Figure 14: FT of internal corrosion in the subsea pipeline (Khan, 2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36 
 
Table 4: Probability of primary events in FT (Khan,2016) 
Basic event 
 
Probability of occurrence 
X1 Presence of O2 9.77E-03 
X2 Presence of CO2 5.00E-03 
X3 Presence of H2S 7.15E-03 
X4 Presence of water 5.00E-03 
X5 Inhibitor failure 6.23E-03 
X6 Internal coating failure 7.74E-03 
X7 Poor pigging performance 4.23E-03 
X11 Internal large stress 5.50E-03 
X12 External large stress 2.7E-03 
X13 Residual stress 2.0E-02 
X14 Stress concentration 7.26E-03 
 
The fault tree is then mapped to BN at time ‘t,' with discrete nodes, with prior probabilities 
of root nodes same as that of probability of primary events in FT. The discrete nodes consist of 2 
states i.e. ‘true’ and ‘false’. ‘true’ meaning the presence of variable in dangerous range that can 
contributes to corrosion and ‘false’ meaning presence of variable in safe range. The representation 
of BN is as shown in figure 15. 
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Figure 15: Framework of static BN 
 
To develop a DBN, the root nodes at time ‘t’ and ‘t+2' are connected to each other with an 
arc representing the temporal dependence between the two BN. This is shown in figure 16. The 
DBN is quantified using conditional probability table of events at ‘t+2' with respect to the 
occurrence of events at a time ‘t' as shown in tables 5,6 &7 based on the assumption that CO2 and 
H2O increase constantly by 80% and other variables contributing to IC changes by 50%. 
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 Table 5: Conditional probability table of other corrosion promoting agent at ‘t+2’ 
Other corrosion promoting agents(t+2) 
Other corrosion promoting 
agents(t) 
True False 
True 0.5 0.5 
False 0.5 0.5 
 
Table 6: Conditional probability table of H2O agents at ‘t+2’ 
Other corrosion promoting agents(t+2) 
Other corrosion promoting 
agents(t) 
True False 
True 0.5 0.5 
False 0.5 0.5 
 
Table 7: Conditional probability table of CO2 at ‘t+2’ 
Presence of CO2(t+2) 
Presence of CO2(t) True False 
True 0.8 0.1 
False 0.2 0.9 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Framework of DBN for internal corrosion occurrence 
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4.2 Calculation of corrosion rate and probability update 
 
Equation 8 is implemented in the equation node, corrosion rate(t) of the model as shown 
in figure 17. The equation node calculates the internal corrosion rate and was found to be 0.2 
mm/year at every time step, since the defect depth increases constantly for 1mm/yr. 
 
Figure 17: Representation of interdependencies between equation nodes for corrosion rate  
       calculation       
 
Since the corrosion rate is greater than zero, an evidence of internal corrosion occurrence 
being true is given to the internal corrosion node. Posterior probabilities are then computed at 
every time step. Table 8 and table 9 shows the posterior probabilities at time ‘t’ and subsequent 
time steps respectively.  
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Table 8: Posterior probability for corrosion promoting agents at time ‘t’. 
Basic event Posterior Probability 
(Evidence as IC=’True’) 
X1 Presence of O2 0.449 
X2 Presence of CO2 0.23 
X3 Presence of H2S 0.328 
X4 Presence of water 1 
X5 Inhibitor failure 0.134 
X6 Internal coating failure 0.159 
X7 Poor pigging performance 0.004 
X11 Internal large stress 0.118 
X12 External large stress 0.019 
X13 Residual stress 0.431 
X14 Stress concentration 0.156 
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Table 9: Posterior probability for corrosion promoting agents for all the time steps except at time  
               ‘t’      
Basic event 
 
Posterior probability 
(Evidence as IC=’True’) 
X1 Presence of O2 0.613 
X2 Presence of CO2 0.32 
X3 Presence of H2S 0.613 
X4 Presence of water 1 
X5 Inhibitor failure 0.508 
X6 Internal coating failure 0.508 
X7 Poor pigging performance 0.508 
X11 Internal large stress 0.508 
X12 External large stress 0.508 
X13 Residual stress 0.508 
X14 Stress concentration 0.508 
 
From the computation of posterior probabilities, it has been observed that water is the major 
causal factor leading to corrosion at all time steps and measures must be taken to remove the water 
content from the pipe after which the major causal factor is presence of oxygen. 
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4.3 Calculation of POF of pipeline 
 
Limit State Function equations are used to calculate the POF of pipeline due to a small 
leak, large leak, rupture and then the overall probability of failure of the pipeline by implementing 
equations 3 to 16 in the model using equation node as shown in figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18: BN framework representing the calculation of probability of failure of pipeline 
 
Figures 19,20,21,22 show the estimated probability of LSFs being less than 0 and the overall 
probability of failure of pipeline respectively over additional time interval from initial time ‘t’. 
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Figure 19: Probability of LSF1 being less than 0 
 
 
Figure 20: Probability of LSF2 being less than 0 
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Figure 21: Probability of LSF3 being less than 0 
Figure 22: POF of pipeline 
4.4 PFD calculation of ESD system 
The ESD system is considered as the safety barrier used in this study. The ESD consists of 
a pressure sensor, 2 mass flow sensors, logic solver solenoid actuator and an isolation valve. 
Pressure sensors are commonly installed to monitor the pressure in the pipeline, so it's natural to 
use them for detecting a leak. The occurrence of a pipeline leak results in pressure drop. A lower 
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limit pressure below operating pressure is set, and if the pressure drops below the setpoint, trip is 
initiated. A pressure sensor's sensitivity depends on leak location (Geiger). Therefore, flow 
monitoring using two mass flow sensors that operate on balancing method is recommended. 
Balancing method uses mass conservatism principle i.e., the mass of the fluid entering the pipeline 
at a particular time difference, Δt is the same as the fluid exiting the pipeline at the same time 
interval Δt. Flow sensors are installed at both inlet and outlet of the pipeline (Geiger). Flow is 
monitored for change and a trip is initiated, if the value contradicts the mass conservatism 
principle. The logic solver converts the analog input signal received by the sensors to a digital 
signal which is sent to the actuator. As the logic solver processes the analog signal sent by these 
sensors, it decides according to the pre-defined logic by the user. If the nature of the signal is found 
to be abnormal and is not in accordance to user's definition of the safe state, the output signal 
changes the Boolean value accordingly and is sent to the solenoid actuator. The solenoid actuator 
then de-energizes and closes the isolation valve, shutting down the pipeline. Figure 23 shows the 
workflow of components in an ESD system. The logic solver, actuator and shutoff valve are 
assumed to follow 1oo1 architecture. For a more effective system, the pressure sensor and both 
mass flow sensors are assumed to follow 1oo1 architecture. Both mass flow sensors are considered 
as one component that follows1oo1 architecture since they work on mass conservatism principle 
and are not redundant systems.    
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Figure 23: Workflow of components in ESD system 
The overall PFD of the ESD system is calculated as follows: 
PFD avg=(
1
2
𝑥𝜆𝑃𝑆𝐿𝑥𝑇𝐼𝑃𝑆𝐿) 𝑥(
1
2
𝑥(𝜆𝑀𝐹𝑆1+𝜆𝑀𝐹𝑆1)𝑥𝑇𝐼𝑀𝐹𝑆))+(
1
2
𝑥𝜆𝐿𝑆𝑥𝑇𝐼𝐿𝑆) + 
(
1
2
𝑥𝜆𝐴𝑥𝑇𝐼𝐴)+(
1
2
𝑥𝜆𝐼𝑉𝑥𝑇𝐼𝐼𝑉) (18) 
The test time interval of all the components is 3 years the and values for dangerous failure rates of 
the components of ESD system is shown in table 10. 
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  Table 10: Estimation of PFD of ESD system 
Assuming that, the ESD system was not tested within the testing time interval of 3 years 
and was tested after 4 years at a time ‘t+12' and ‘t+18', the overall PFD increases at those time 
steps. From ‘t’ to ‘t+10’ the POF of pipeline is 0. Therefore, there is no loss of containment which 
implies that the frequency of C1=1 and C2=C3=0. Given, the POF of pipeline is greater than 0, 
and the PFD of ESD system from time ‘t+12’ and to ‘t+18’, the frequency of C2 & C3 are 
calculated, and the results are as shown in the table 11.    
    Table 11: Frequencies of consequences C2 and C3 
From the results, it has been observed that frequency of high loss of containment is the highest at 
time ‘t+18’ due to the following reasons: 
 POF of pipeline being 1; and
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 Non-compliance to follow testing of safety barrier components within the test time interval 
recommended by the manufacturer resulting in increased PFD. 
Whereas, frequency of limited loss of containment is highest at ‘t+12’ since the POF pipeline is 
comparatively low though the safety barrier is not tested according to recommended practice. The 
POF of pipeline is zero from time ‘t’ to ‘t+10’ and hence there is no loss of containment during 
that time span.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
This research has an application to carry out a risk assessment for pipeline internal 
corrosion after inspection of a known time interval of defect depth. Given the defect depth, this 
model can help in investigating the causes of corrosion and also predict the consequence due to 
corrosion while dealing with the dynamic dependence of corrosion promoting agents and changing 
corrosion rate. This model also helps in visualizing the varying impact of irregular testing of safety 
barrier, given the probability of failure of pipeline on the consequence. A discrete DBN is used to 
represent the relationship of corrosion promoting agents with internal corrosion and their 
relationship between the two-time slices. The corrosion rate is calculated using the linear corrosion 
rate equation. Changing corrosion rate over time is depicted with changing defect depth after 
inspection. The possibility of a small leak, large leak and rupture are found out using LSF equations 
at each time step. The dynamic change in the probability of failure on demand of safety barrier 
depends on the testing time interval. If the components of safety barrier are tested within the 
regular testing time interval complied by the industry, the PFD remains the same. Otherwise, the 
PFD changes according to the time when the components of safety barrier are tested. Three 
consequences are defined; No loss of containment, limited loss of containment and huge loss of 
containment. Given the probability of failure and changing reliability of safety barriers over time, 
the frequency of consequence is calculated and analyzed. 
A case study was proposed that considers a transmission pipeline that carries crude oil in 
high consequence area. It was assumed that the inspection of defect depth is carried out once in 
every 2 years. Therefore, the time interval between the risk assessment process was 2 years and 9-
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time steps were considered. From the results, it had been observed that the primary causal factor 
for corrosion is the presence of water at every time-step. The possibility of pipeline getting 
deteriorated starts at time ‘t+12’  and adverse consequence can be expected at time ‘t+18' due to 
failure of pipeline and high PFD of the ESD system. 
Future work is recommended as follows: 
 To use non-linear corrosion rate model 
 To use continuous variable instead of discrete variables for corrossion 
promoting agents  
 To consider the human and organizational factor in the risk assessment model 
 To use Weibull distribution to demonstrate failure rate of safety barrier 
 Establish dynamic change of consequence  
 Perform an uncertainty analysis 
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